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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

ALAN DA VIS, EXECUTOR
Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO. 312322

)

JUDGE RONALD SUSTER
)

vs

)

STATE OF OHIO
Defendant

)

DEFENDANT'S RESPONSE TO
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR INJUNCTION
FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER TO ENJOIN
EXHUMATION OF MARILYN SHEPPARD

Defendant, State of Ohio, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, and Assistant
Prosecutor Marilyn B. Cassidy, sets forth herein its response to Plaintiffs motion to e~join
exhumation of Marilyn Sheppard. Defendant's response is grounded upon the principle that the
county prosecutor has statutory authority, independent of this Court's authority, and within his
sound discretion to exhume a body pursuant to R.C. 313.18.

Plaintiffs application for

injunctive relief is both procedurally and substantively insufficient. Finally, the Prosecutor's
order does not constitute an abuse of discretion, all as is set forth in the memorandum attached
hereto and incorporated herein by reference .

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON,
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
CUYAHOGA COUNTY

~

A LYNB
(0014647)
Assistant Pr ecuting Attorney
Justice Center
1200 Ontario Street - 8th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785

ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION
On or about August 19, 1999, the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor ordered the exhumation
of the remains of Marilyn Sheppard. The State of Ohio is named defendant in a civil action for
wrongful imprisonment of Samuel H. Sheppard. The plaintiff alleges that Richard Eberling, and
not Samuel H. Sheppard, committed the murder of Marilyn Sheppard in 1954. Hence, the civil
action is based upon an underlying homicide, and the hypothesis that the murder was committed
by Eberling, not Samuel H. Sheppard. The prosecutor is within his lawful authority to order the
disinterment for the purpose of gaining further information relative to the commission of a crime
within Cuyahoga County, especially where the State is exposed to civil liability arising from the
same homicide.

LAW AND ARGUMENT
A. THE COUNTY PROSECUTOR HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE
DISINTERMENT OF ANY DEAD BODY UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
CORONER

R.C. 313.18 Disinterment of body
The prosecuting attorney or coroner may order the disinterment of any
dead body, under the direction and supervision of the coroner, and may
authorize the removal of such body by the coroner to the quarters
established for the use of such coroner, for the purpose of examination
and autopsy.
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The statutory language is clear. It is not within the purvue of the court to alter clear language.
It is a cardinal rule that the court must first look to language of a statute itself to determine

legislative intent. Courts do not have authority to ignore plain and unambiguous language of
statute under guise of statutory interpretation, but must give effect to words used; in other words,
courts may not delete words used or insert words not used. In re Collier (Athens 1993) 85 Ohio
App. 3d 232. In interpreting a statute words must be taken in their usual, normal or customary
meaning. Love v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (Athens 1993) 86 Ohio App 3d 394. In Ohio, the
specific inclusion by the legislature of items in a statute implies the exclusion of others.
Kirsheman v. Paulin (1951), 155 Ohio St. 137, 146, Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473. See
also Investors Reit One v. Jacobs (1989) 46 Ohio St. 3d 176.
Plaintiff argues that the intent of the statute is "to allow the state through the prosecutor
or the coroner to investigate homicides". That position is not only erroneous but contrary to the
plain language of the statute. There is no limiting language within R. C. 313 .18. The court may
not impose limiting language that the legislature did not include.
Additionally, the County Prosecutor is an elected official with specific powers and
responsibilities to the citizens of the county.

See R.C. 309.01 and 309.08.

309.08 Powers and duties of prosecuting attorney; organized crime task force
membership; rewards for information about drug related offenses.
(A) The prosecuting attorney may inquire into the commission of
crimes within the county. The prosecuting attorney shall prosecute,
on behalf of the state, all complaints, suits, and controversies in
which the state is a party ....
The legislative language does not limit the prosecutor's authority to criminal actions. Rather, it is
incumbent upon the prosecutor to conduct the legal affairs within his county where the state is
a party. Black's Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition, defines the word "prosecute" as:
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"1. To commence and carry out a legal action 2. To institute and
pursue a criminal action against (a person) 3. To engage in; carry on"
Under all of the foregoing statutory and case law, the prosecutor, as an elected official, is
exercising his authority lawfully. Accordingly plaintiffs motion must be denied.
B. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO SATISFY THE STANDARDS UNDER WHICH INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED

Ohio Civil Rule 65 sets forth the procedures by which a Temporary Restraining Order and
an injunction may be sought. A petition for TRO requires that plaintiff file a verified complaint.
An application for injunctive relief may be made by complaint or by motion.

It is unclear from

the document at bar exactly which remedy plaintiff herein seeks. As a matter of record, defendant
objects to issuance of a TRO upon an unverified petition. Accordingly, defendant surmises that
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief by motion pursuant to Ohio Rule 65.
Although Civil Rule 65 does not specify the standards for issuing an injunction, the
following guidelines are appropriate for a court's consideration: (1) the likelihood or probability
of the movant's success on the merits; (3) whether the movant has an adequate remedy at law; (3)
ifthe issuance of the preliminary injunction will prevent the claimed irreparable injury; (4) what
injury to the parties and others will be served by the granting of injunctive relief; (5) the public
interest that will be served by the granting of injunctive relief; (6) whether the injunctive relief
sought is for the purpose of maintaining the status quo pending trial on the merits . Diamond Co.
v. Gentry Acquisition Corp., Inc. (1988), 48 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 531 N.E. 2d 777.
Furthermore, the award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity is not strictly a
matter of right, even though irreparable injury may otherwise result to the plaintiff; even in suits
in which only private interests are involved, the award is a matter of sound judicial discretion, in
the exercise of which the court balances the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to
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them according as they may be affected by the granting or witholding of the injunction, and it will
avoid such inconvenience and injury so far as may be, by attaching conditions to the award, such
as the requirement of an injunction bond conditioned upon payment of any damage caused by the
injunction ifthe plaintiff's contentions are not sustained. Yakus v. U.S. (1944), 64 S.Ct. 660, 321
U.S. 414, 88 L.Ed. 834. In determining whether a trial court committed an abuse of discretion in
denying a preliminary injunction, the appellate court can consider (1) whether petitioner has
made a strong showing of probable success at trial; (2) whether petitioner has shown irreparable
injury; (3) whether issuance of the preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm to other;
(4) where the public interest lies.
In the case at bar, plaintiff has made no statement of irreparable harm , nor has he
demonstrated probable success at the trial of this matter. Issuance of an injunction cannot be said
to cause substantial harm to others. Finally, the State of Ohio submits that the public interest lies
in learning as much information as possible in the case on the merits. Accordingly, plaintiff's
motion must be denied.
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C. DISINTERMENT OF MARILYN SHEPP ARD DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE

OF THE DISCOVERY PROCESS, NOR DOES IT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF
DISCRETION BY THE PROSECUTOR
As is discussed above, the county prosecutor may order the disinterment of a dead body
in the exercise of his own powers and responsibilities as an elected official. Inasmuch, as the
State of Ohio is the named defendant in a wrongful imprisonment action, it is proper for the
prosecutor to defend the action. Indeed, the state and its elected officials have authority unique
unto themselves. Logically, in a lawsuit against the state, these distinctions become evident.
Plaintiff asserts that the Prosecutor's order to disinter Mrs. Sheppard amounts to an abuse
of his discretion and abuse of the discovery process. Abuse of discretion connotes more than an
error of law or judgment, it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable." Blackemore v. Blakemore (1983), .5 Ohio St 3d 217 quoting State v. Adams
(1980), 62 Ohio St 2d 151, 157. Abuse of discretion implies a decision that is without a
reasonable basis and is clearly wrong.
In the case at bar, a reasonable basis for disinterment is abundantly apparent. The
Prosecutor's order is based soundly upon factual matters relative to a homicide in Cuyahoga
County. The State of Ohio, represented by the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor, is named defendant
and exposed to liability in a lawsuit alleging that evidence relevant to the homicide should be
reviewed. Fmiher, it is the plaintiff who has consistently argued to the court in this case, until
now, that the office of the county prosecutor must make every effort within its authority to gain
information concerning plaintiff's Eberling hypothesis. All of these matters form the basis of a
rational decision within the authority of the prosecutor.

7

With regard to civil discovery rules, the independent authority of the prosecutor has been
discussed . Plaintiff has no standing to request a protective order since the remains of Marilyn
Sheppard are not sought pursuant to a discovery request, nor are they under his care, custody and
control . However, the prosecutor is aware of his responsibilities under the rules with regard to
supplementing witness and exhibit lists as necessary to allow plaintiff reasonable access to nonprivileged, discoverable information. To that end, the prosecutor is available, as soon as the
scheduled pretrial date of August 30, 1999 to fully apprise the court and plaintiff's counsel, in
chambers, as to the details of expert analysis which is expected to be conducted.

CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing facts and principles of law, defendant respectfully requests that plaintiff's
motion be overruled.

MARIL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Injunction
and/or Protective Order to Enjoin Exhumation was served via fax and via ordinary U.S. mail
postage pre-paid upon Terry H. Gilbert, attorney for Plaintiff, at 1370 Ontario, Suite 1700,
Cleveland, Ohio 44113, this

30

day of August, 1999.

Assistant Prosecuting
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